Serbia and Venezuela maintain one of the oldest formally established relationships between Southeast Europe and Latin America — dating, by the Serbian foreign ministry's own record, to 13 April 1882 — yet no dedicated peer-reviewed study of the dyad exists in any lan- guage, a gap this review both documents and begins to fill (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 2026; Simić, 2024). The aim of the article is to reconstruct the diplomatic, economic, military, and Non-Aligned-Movement-mediated history of the relationship across 1950–2026 and to explain its paradoxical structure: a bilateral trade of only 594,000 euros in 2025 coexisting with high-visibility political alignment — Venezuela's steadfast non-recognition of Ko- sovo, Belgrade's continued dealings with the Maduro government through the 2019 dual-presi- dency crisis, and a Venezuelan ministerial presence at the movement's sixtieth-anniversary com- memoration hosted by Serbia in October 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 2026; Visoka, 2024; Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2021). The research applies a structured review methodology: a corpus of 60 peer-reviewed studies published 2019–2026, ver- ified item by item, is synthesized with a documentary base of treaties, declarations, and archival records, and organized through a five-channel periodization of the relationship. The original con- tribution of the article is the concept of legacy-mediated alignment — an interstate alignment sustained by inherited multilateral capital and reciprocal sovereignty norms rather than by mate- rial exchange — operationalized in a five-period, five-channel Bilateral Alignment Matrix whose every cell is documentarily anchored. Key findings: the relationship's intensity peaks coincide exclusively with Non-Aligned institutional moments — 1961, 1976, 1989, and 2021 — rather than with bilateral economic or military interest; the economic and military channels never devel- oped beyond framework agreements, with no major-conventional-weapons transfers registered in either direction across the entire window (SIPRI, 2025); and the post-2008 alignment rests on a reciprocal non-recognition exchange — Kosovo for the Venezuelan opposition's interim pres- idency — that functions as mutual sovereignty insurance between two states contesting external verdicts on their statehood questions (Newman & Visoka, 2023; Ahlborn, 2025). The framework is transferable to other post-socialist–Global South dyads sustained by non-aligned memory.